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ON AUGUSTINE'S WAY OUT
David P. Hunt

This paper seeks to rehabilitate St. Augustine's widely dismissed response to
the alleged incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and free will. This
requires taking a fresh look at his analysis in On Free Choice of the Will, and
arguing its relevance to the current debate. Along the way, mistaken interpretations of Augustine are rebutted, his real solution is developed and defended,
a reason for his not anticipating Boethius's atemporalist solution is suggested,
a favorable comparison with Ockham is made, rival solutions are rejected, and
the aporetic nahne of the problem is explained.

On the traditional understanding of divine omniscience, Cod is both infallible and also cognizant of future contingents. But a prediction is infallible
only if, once made, it cannot turn out false. Since nothing escapes divine
foresight, no part of the future can happen in any way other than it will
actually happen. But if no alternative to the actual future is so much as possible, a standard condition for free and morally responsible agency can
never be satisfied. It follows that divine omniscience and free agency, as
traditionally understood, are not compossible.
This is the ancient problem of "theological fatalism," which received its
first clear expression in St. Augustine's On Free Choice of the Will. Renewed
interest in this problem during the last thirty years has pushed the ideas of
William Ockham to the center of discussion, with "Ockham's way out" (the
title of a notable defense of this approach by Alvin Plantinga) attracting
more defenders than any rival solution to the problem.! But while
Ockham's star has risen, Augustine's own solution to the problem has suffered from relative neglect. The purpose of this paper is to redress the
imbalance.
My primary objective in rehabilitating Augustine is to make a contribution toward the current debate over theological fatalism, not to advance
the frontiers of Augustine scholarship. At the same time, an important reason that Augustine's analysis has not been taken more seriously is that it
has been widely misunderstood. This makes it necessary to provide a corrected account of Augustine's position before arguing its rightful place in
contemporary discussions of theological fatalism. The plan of the paper,
then, is this: section I warns against mistaken approaches to Augustine's
position, while section II presents Augustine's actual solution; section III
then compares Augustine's way out with Ockham's, and section IV sums
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up the case for Augustine's relevance to the current debate. ''''hile it is
always profitable for Christian philosophers to spend time in Augustine's
company, readers uncorrupted by the standard interpretation of his position or endowed with little interest in Augustinian exegesis might wish to
skip the bulk of section U
I

The most widely cited sources for Augustine's treatment of theological
fatalism are On Free Choice of the Will and The City of God. Neither is transparent in its teaching; but the latter is especially untidy, owing in large measure to Augustine's polemical engagement with Roman history, which
leads him in Book V to introduce the topic of fatalism as a problem in
Roman Stoicism, an approach which results in his importing into the argument various Stoic concerns (such as an "order of causes" mediating
between divine knowledge and human actions) which play no essential role
in recent formulations of the problem. For this reason, the search for a single strategy to put forward under the rubric of "Augustine's way out" will
be better served by a focus on the more direct form that the argument takes
in 011 Free Choice of the Will.
The problem of theological fatalism is raised in this dialogue at the beginning of Book III, in response to Evodius's worry that the doctrine of divine
foreknowledge may thwart Augustine'S attempt to trace the origin of evil to
free choice of the will. Augustine summarizes the problem as follows:
Surely this is the question that troubles and perplexes you: how can
the following two propositions, that God has foreknowledge of all
future events, and that we do not sin by necessity but by free will, be
made consistent with each other? "If God foreknows that man will
sin," you say, "it is necessary that man sin." If man must sin, his sin is
not a result of the will's choice, but is instead a fixed and inevitable
necessity. You fear now that this reasoning results either in the blasphemous denial of God's foreknowledge or, if we deny this, the
admission that we sin by necessity, not by will. (lII.3)
If we let 'W' stand for any sinful movement of the will, the argument
Augustine is called upon to counter can be formulated as follows:
(1) W is foreknown (by God) ~ W is necessary

(2) W is necessary ~ -(W is free)
:. W is foreknown (by God) ~ -(W is free)
This conclusion, if accepted, leaves the theist with the unpalatable option of
affirming the antecedent (and losing free will) or denying the consequent
(and losing divine foreknowledge). Since the argument is clearly valid, its
conclusion can be resisted only if one of its premises is false.
The argument above, though highly schematic, is nevertheless congruent
with modern formulations. (The latter tend to pay more attention to the
derivation of step (1).) So Augustine is at least addressing the same prob-
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lem as modern commentators. It is his solution to the problem that has
been thought to be of questionable relevance to the contemporary debate.
In coming to a just appreciation of Augustine's position, however, there are
at least two red herrings that must be avoided.
The first of these is a mistaken assimilation of the problem of theological
fatalism, addressed in chs. 2-4, to a related problem taken up in ch. 1. In
that chapter Evodius is concerned with the threat to free will posed by what
might be called "natural necessity": "if free will has been given in such a
way that this movement [of the will] is natural to it, then it is turned to lesser goods by necessity. There is no blame to be found where nature and
necessity rule." Augustine concurs: "If this movement exists naturally and
necessarily, it cannot be blameworthy at all." It can thus appear that
Augustine is endorsing the following conditional:
(2') W is necessary -7 -(W is blameworthy).
But since he also avers that "this movement by which the will is turned
from immutable to transitory goods ... is voluntary and therefore blameworthy," the following conditional also comes into play:
(2*) W is free

-7

W is blameworthy.

And (2') together with (2*) entails (2). This suggests that Augustine has
already granted (2) when he comes to formulate the argument for theological fatalism in chs. 2 and 3, so that his response to this argument (whatever
it turns out to be) must involve a denial of (1).
This suggestion, however, is in error. Augustine in fact never asserts in
ch. 1 that necessity simpliciter is incompatible with moral blame or free
agency; instead, he resolutely restricts his claims to the narrower notion of
natural necessity (whatever that might be). But there is no reason to think
that the freedom-annihilating necessity which governs the movement of a
falling stone (Augustine's example of natural necessity from ch. 1) is relevantly similar to the kind of necessity with which divine foreknowledge
threatens future actions. Nor does Augustine do anything to encourage a
conflation between the two cases: the word natura and its cognates, which
bulk so large in ch. 1, are nowhere to be found in chs. 2-4, where the problem posed by divine foreknowledge is being raised and addressed. The discussion of natural necessity in ch. 1 therefore leaves it an open question
whether the (possibly quite different) kind of necessity supposedly implied
by divine foreknowledge is also incompatible with free agency. This means
that the truth-value of premise (2), contrary appearances notwithstanding,
remains to be settled as Augustine undertakes the assessment of theological
fatalism in chs. 2-4.
The other red herring consists of various indications in ch. 3 that this is
where Augustine provides his principal response to the argument for theological fatalism. This herring is a bit slipperier than the first, but it is nevertheless worth pinning down. It certainly seems, on a first reading (and perhaps even a second and a third), that Augustine raises the problem of theological fatalism in ch. 2, then restates and solves it (to his satisfaction) in ch.
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3. There is enough evidence for this reading that most commentators have
accepted some version of it. 3 The evidence that Augustine's solution is to be
found in ch. 3 is threefold. First, Augustine brings various conditions for
free will into play in ch. 3, and endeavors to show that these conditions are
unaffected by divine foreknowledge-just the sort of move one would
expect him to make when presenting a solution to the problem. Second,
Augustine concludes his examination of these conditions with what sounds
like a declaration of victory over theological fatalism: "So it follows that we
do not deny that God has foreknowledge of all things to be, and yet that we
will what we wil1." Finally, the chapter ends with Evodius's apparent capitulation: "I no longer deny that whatever God foreknows must come to be,
and that he foreknows our sins in such a way that our will still remains free
in us and lies in our power."
A strong indication that something must be wrong with this interpretation, despite the evidence in its favor, comes at the beginning of the next
chapter, where we find Evodius's doubts still unresolved:
Of course I do not dare deny any of these points. Yet I still cannot see
how God's foreknowledge of our sins can be reconciled with our free
choice in sinning. God must, we admit, be just and have foreknowledge. But I would like to know by what justice God punishes sins
which must be; or how it is that they do not have to be, when He foreknows that they will be; or why anything which is necessarily done in
His creation is not to be attributed to the Creator. (I1I.4)
Either Evodius has already forgotten what was just accomplished in ch. 3,
or the accomplishments of that chapter (despite initial appearances) leave
the problem of theological fatalism still in place. There can be little doubt
that the latter possibility is the correct one, given the reply Augustine makes
to Evodius's renewed query in ch. 4 (to which we will soon turn).
Rereading Evodius's apparent capitulation at the end of ch. 3 in light of the
continuing discussion in ch. 4 makes it clear that Evodius is not thereby
declaring the problem solved, but simply admitting its "aporetic" nature:
the two poles of the dilemma (divine foreknowledge and free will) are compatible with each other after all, but how they can be compatible is another
matter altogether. This latter is the problem remaining for ch. 4, as Evodius
explicitly announces at its outset.
It's a good thing that Augustine cannot have regarded the discussion in
ch. 3 as complete, since it is clearly inadequate as it stands. The three conditions for free will that he deploys in this chapter are: (i) that W be possessed
by the subject in the right way ("God's foreknowledge ... does not take
from you the will to be happy when you begin to be happy"); (ii) that W be
approved by the subject ("When we will, if the will itself is lacking in us, we
surely do not will"); and (iii) that W lie within the subject'S power ("Nor can
it be a will if it is not in our power"). While these three conditions are plausibly thought to be necessary for free will, they are clearly not sufficient in any
robustly incompatibilist sense. This can be brought out by noting how all
three tests could be satisfied even when W is causally determined by events
or states obtaining prior to the subject'S birth. Nothing about causal deter-
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minism is incompatible with the first two tests: there are no grounds for
denying that W belongs to the subject, so long as the causal chain eventuating in W passes through the subject for a sufficient length of time and in a
sufficiently intimate manner; nor are there any grounds for doubting that
the subject genuinely approves of W (and approves his approval, etc.), since
any level of approval may itself be causally determined. The same is true of
the third test, since Augustine offers a "conditional" analysis of power very
much like that of 20th-century philosophers whose goal is to render human
freedom compatible with causal determinism: "we cannot deny that we
have the power, unless we cannot obtain what we will through an act of
will or unless the will is absent." But of course the incompatibilist will
maintain that there is yet another ground for ascribing powerlessness to
someone, beyond the inability to obtain what one wills, namely, the inability to control one's will, i.e., to will otherwise than one actually wills. Even
taken jointly, then, the three conditions from ch. 3 are insufficient to show
that W can remain free in the incompatibilist sense which is at issue in the
argument for theological fatalism.
Of course, the fact that a 20th-century incompatibilist would be disappointed by the analysis of free will in ch. 3 does not by itself show that
Augustine would find it similarly inadequate. This is, after all, a man who
could say at the end of his life, "I tried hard to maintain the free decision of
the human will, but the grace of God was victorious."l Even in On Free
Choice of the Will, written while he was still struggling to maintain freedom
of the will, it is no easy matter to locate Augustine with any precision along
the compatibilist-incompatibilist continuum." But all this is beside the point:
the evidence for Augustine's attitude toward the three conditions of ch. 3 is
to be found, not in speculation on how he would have responded to those
conditions had he been an incompatibilist, but in the place those conditions
actually occupy in the text. It is the text which reveals how unlikely it is that
Augustine could have regarded the three conditions of ch. 3 as jointly sufficient for free will, and in revealing this, incidentally preserves the incompatibilist credentials of Augustine'S solution, whether or not he was himself an
incompatibilist. The suspicion that this second herring (like the first) is
indeed red finds confirmation once we tum to the solution Augustine actually puts forward.
II

We have seen that Augustine's analysis in ch. 3 is incomplete and that he
recognizes it as such. How then does it fit into his larger solution to the
problem of theological fatalism?
An important clue to Augustine's understanding of the three conditions
from ch. 3 is the fact that the discussion of natural necessity in ch. 1 makes
use of the same three conditions: (i) the "possession" condition ("it belongs
to the spirit alone"); (ii) the "approval" condition ("we accuse a spirit of sin
when we prove that it has preferred to enjoy lower goods"); and (iii) the
"power" condition ("the stone does not have it in its power to check its
downward motion"). But another condition is also mooted in ch. I, alongside these three, when Augustine reminds Evodius of the conclusion,
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reached in Bk. I, that "the mind ... cannot be forced (cogi) to serve lust by
something superior, or by an equal, ... [or] by something inferior." This
"compulsion" condition is not brought into play at all in the analysis of ch.
3; indeed, the word cogo and its cognates are completely absent from chs. 23. This is itself good reason to think that the resources Augustine was at
pains to develop in ch. 1 are not yet fully deployed by the end of ch. 3; the
problem's persistence into ch. 4 should not then be surprising.
Cogo does, however, reappear with a vengeance in ch. 4, which begins
with Augustine asking, "Will you deny that we sin by will and not under
compulsion (cogente) from anyone, either higher, lower, or equal?" The key
passage in ch. 4 is saturated with compulsion-talk:
unless I am mistaken, your foreknowledge that a man will sin does
not of itself necessitate (cogeres) the sin. Your foreknowledge did not
force (cogeret) him to sin even though he was, without doubt, going to
sin; otherwise you would not foreknow that which was to be. Thus
these two things are not contradictories. As you, by your foreknowledge, know what someone else is going to do of his own will, so God
forces (cogens) no one to sin; yet He foreknows those who will sin by
their own will.
Why cannot He justly punish what He does not force (cogiO to be
done, even though He foreknows it? Your recollection of events in the
past does not compel (cogis) them to occur. In the same way God's
foreknowledge of future events does not compel (cogit) them to take
place. As you remember certain things that you have done and yet
have not done all the things that you remember, so God foreknows all
the things of which He Himself is the Cause, and yet He is not the
Cause of all that He foreknows.
Augustine admits elsewhere in ch. 4 that foreknowledge entails necessity in
the sense that what is foreknown must happen and is certain to happen; but
in the quoted passage he denies that it entails necessity by compelling or
causing what is foreknown, and claims that this is enough to defuse the conflict between divine foreknowledge and voluntary agency. Lack of causal
compulsion provides the final necessary condition for free will, one which
in conjunction with the other three conditions is finally sufficient as well.
What becomes clear in ch. 4, once the red herrings discussed in the preceding section of this paper have been identified and the proper significance of this chapter has been appreciated, is that Augustine's real objection
to the argument for theological fatalism is directed against premise (2). He
is perfectly willing, on the other hand, to grant the fatalistic case for premise
0). To understand what is distinctive about Augustine's position, it is necessary to elaborate on this adjudication of the argument's two premises.
In one sense, at least, practically everyone would acknowledge that (1)
can be true while (2) is false. For suppose, in saying that W is necessary
when foreknown (by God), (1) is asserting only that W follows necessarily
from its being foreknown (by God); that is,
0')

Necessarily [W is foreknown (by God) ~ WJ.
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Then (1) is clearly true, because 0') is true; but (2) would then be just as
clearly false. If W were necessary only in the sense that it follows necessarily from something or other (e.g., from divine knowledge of W, or-why not
eliminate the middleman?-from W itself), this would go no distance at all
toward showing that W is unfree.
For (2) to stand a chance of being true, it is W itself that must be necessary, and this requires that the first premise be parsable in the form
0*) W is foreknown (by God)

~

necessarily (W).

Call this "absolute necessity," as opposed to the "hypothetical necessity"
displayed by 0'). But is 0*) remotely plausible as a non-question-begging
premise in an argument designed to demonstrate (and not just assert) theological fatalism? Sure it is, and anyone at all familiar with debates over
fatalism (particularly as they have developed during the last thirty years)
knows how the moves go at this point. Since God has always foreknown W,
He foreknew W prior to any time (before the occurrence of W) that one
cares to specify. Let 't' designate such a time. Relative to t, God already
possesses foreknowledge of W. But what is already the case cannot be
made not to be the case. The fact that God foreknew W is therefore necessary
in the sense that it is no longer possible (relative to t) for God not to have
foreknown W. This is a very strong form of necessity, much stronger than
natural necessity. (Presumably God can countermand natural necessity, but
not even God, Augustine notes in Against Faustus 25.5, can undo the past.)
Since such necessity is relative to time (what is unavoidably necessary when
past might not have been unavoidably necessary when future), let us call it
"temporal necessity." Because W was foreknown (by God) prior to t, its
being foreknown (by God) is temporally necessary at t. But God's cognizing W entails W (since He can't be mistaken in anything He believes). It
therefore follows that W is also temporally necessary at t (on the grounds
that, if something is unavoidably necessary, whatever it entails is also
unavoidably necessary.) Thus there is a defensible 0 *)-like reading of
premise (1). And this reading, unlike the hypothetically necessary 0'), is at
least relevant to the claim being made in premise (2). Since t can be set as
early as one pleases, let it be a time prior to the birth of our erring agent.
Then W is necessary in virtue of the fact that, before the agent even comes
into existence, it is already too late for W to be avoided. This is just the
sense of necessity in which it might plausibly be thought that (2) is true.
This is theological fatalism in its most credible form. Is this the form in
which Augustine is engaging it? That's hard to say. Augustine nowhere
distinguishes between hypothetical and absolute necessity, as Boethius
would later do." This ambiguity in Augustine's analysis cuts two ways: on
the one hand, it's doubtful that his endorsement of (1) reflects a full appreciation of the case that can be made on behalf of absolute necessity (as formulated in the preceding paragraph); on the other hand, there is little reason to
suppose that his acceptance of (1) is based on nothing more than hypothetical necessity, and that he simply overlooks the fallacy of equivocation that
arises when 0') is combined with (2).7 In the absence of a clear Augustinian
account of the necessity at work in the fatalist's argument, the best one can
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do when looking to Augustine for insight into the current debate is to examine his denial of (2) and see whether it addresses the argument in its
strongest (1 *)-like form.
Given his suspect credentials on the free will issue, it is noteworthy that
Augustine does not deny premise (2) because he's a soft determinist who
believes free agency to be compatible with causal determinism. On Free
Choice of the Will admittedly presents a compromised pichlre of creaturely
freedom, and the "ignorance and difficulty" which Augustine ascribes to
the post-Iapsarian human condition undoubtedly leaves us vulnerable to
causal forces; but none of the threats to human agency canvassed in this
work derives from God's foreknowledge of our deeds. Far from presupposing soft determinism, Augustine insists that the reason divine foreknowledge does not jeopardize free agency is precisely that it does not
cause our actions. Augustine can happily grant the fatalist everything he
wants in premise (1) because temporal necessity (as implied by divine foreknowledge) does not entail causal necessity, and only the latter conflicts
with free will. Temporal necessity is determined by the temporal order; but
what is relevant to free agency, Augustine maintains, is the causal/explanatory order. The two orders normally coincide: what is prior in the one order
is prior in the other. In cases of divine foreknowledge, however, the two
orders diverge, and what is temporally closed (because infallibly foreknown) may remain causally/explanatorily open; as Augustine notes in The
City of God, "a man does not therefore sin because God foreknew that he
would sin" (V.lO). This is enough for Augustine to regard W as free despite
the fact that God's foreknowledge of W renders it unavoidably necessary.s
I will say more about this view of free will at the end of section Ill. What
I want to pursue in the remainder of this section is the conception of foreknowledge which makes such freedom possible. Augustine's account in
chapter 4 begins with a comparison between divine and human foreknowledge. In cases where one human being knows what another is going to do,
the foreknowledge of the first person does not stand in a cause-effect relationship with the future action of the second person. If the second person's
action is in fact causally compelled, it isn't the foreknowledge of the first
person that accounts for the compulsion; nor is there any special reason to
think that divine foreknowledge per se has a coercive force lacked by human
foreknowledge. Unfortunately, foreknowledge might still entail compulsion, despite its causal inefficacy, if the causal unavoidability of future
events is a condition for their being known with certainty. Augustine indeed
holds that this is the only condition under which human beings can know the
future: "when we speak of seeing the future, obviously what is seen is not
the things which are not yet because they are still to come, but their causes
and signs do exist here and now.'''' But God is not similarly limited to knowing the future only insofar as it is determined by present causes. It is for this
reason that the comparison with human foreknowledge cannot take
Augustine as far as he needs to go, and we find him switching in mid-argument to human memory as his model for divine foreknowledge.
Memory is more favorable to Augustine's purposes than is ordinary
human foreknowledge. Not only is memory (like foreknowledge) not the
cause of its object, but it is also (unlike human foreknowledge) indepen-
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dent of present causes determining its object. Indeed, the relationship
between memory and remembered event goes in the other direction: it is
the past event that causes, explains, or accounts for the remembrance of
that event. Likewise, Augustine wants to understand God's foreknowledge in such a way that it is the foreknown event that causes, explains, or
accounts for His knowledge, not the other way around. In this respect, at
least, divine foreknowledge is more like human memory than it is like
human foreknowledge. lO
One puzzle regarding Augustine's use of the "reverse memory" model in
On Free Choice of the Will is why he fails to invoke the doctrine of "timeless
eternity" which he endorses elsewhere" and which Boethius later draws on
in developing his own solution to the problem of theological fatalism in
Book V of The Consolation of Philosophy. The "reverse memory" model is
thoroughly temporal. God's anticipation of future events, like our remembrance of past events, involves two temporal relata, so that even though the
explanatory arrow moves with the temporal arrow in cases of human memory and against it in cases of divine foreknowledge, God's knowledge (so
understood) is nevertheless situated in the temporal order. Augustine's failure to correct the temporalist presuppositions underlying the argument for
theological fatalism, along with his adoption of a model which reinforces
those presuppositions, does admittedly look initially puzzling.
It is nevertheless arguable that the account in On Free Choice of the Will fits
quite well with the "timeless eternity" theory, and may even be essential to
it. Though the ascription to God of an eternal existence outside time blocks
any straightforward appeal to temporal necessity, this is insufficient by
itself to dispel the fatalistic threat posed by divine omniscience. If God's
knowing 100 years ago what I will do tomorrow is enough to make tomorrow's actions unavoidable, it's far from obvious that those actions are less
inevitable just because God knows them "from eternity."
The most common brief on behalf of the "Boethian" solution goes something like this. God's atemporal perspective on events is like (timelessly)
observing things while they are happening; but simultaneous observation of
someone else's actions does not render them unavoidably necessary (the fact
that I happen to be watching while you roll down a hill has no implications
for the contingency or evitability of your behavior); by analogy, then, God's
timeless observation of events should have no effect on their contingency.12
One problem with the analogy is that, strictly speaking, the observation
(e.g., of your hillside antics) occurs later than the observed event (information
from the event can't reach the observer faster than the speed of light), so that
there is no ground for any inference regarding the benignancy of truly simultaneous observation. But suppose we ignore this nicety and prescind from
the scientific details ("it's only a thought-experiment, after all"), imagining
that observation and observed event are strictly simultaneous; and let us
grant that the observation, in this counterfactual scenario, would have no
more effect on the agency of the observed than would observations which
obeyed the laws of physics. How would this suggest, even by analogy, that
the assumption of a Boethian relationship between God and history is a condition (either necessary or sufficient) for the defeat of fatalism? Consider
another analogy, that of a driver's hands on the steering wheel of a car.
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Hands and wheel move together, though strictly speaking the hands move
first and their motion is then communicated to the wheel (as the flesh stretches and tautens in the direction of the hands' motion). Disregard this slight
temporal lapse, as we did in the first case, and imagine that the two motions
are strictly simultaneous. The assumption of simultaneity does nothing to
save the wheel from control by the driver or salvage for it any vestige of
"freedom." What make the difference between the observation and steering
cases, when both are assumed to operate under conditions of fictional simultaneity, are the different relations of causal! explanatory dependence which
tie observer to observed in the first case and manipulator to manipulated in
the second. The temporal status of the relata in the two cases is irrelevant.
The same is true in the divine case. Augustine's fundamental insight in
chapter 4 is that free choice must be uncompelled, and that it is the explanatory / causal order which is therefore relevant in determining whether foreknowledge implies fatalism. This insight, inasmuch as it makes the temporal order (and temporal necessity with it) irrelevant, applies equally well
to atemporal knowledge of the future. Augustine can't be bothered with correcting the temporalist bias which underlies the fatalist's argument for the
simple reason that his solution to the problem is indifferent to the question
whether God's knowledge of W can be located in time.13 It is "reverse memory" rather than "simultaneous observation" which best models the relevant
relations. More exactly, while "observation" models the relevant relations
just fine, "simultaneity" has nothing to do with it. Since "simultaneity"
appears to be the whole point of appealing to divine eternity in response to
the problem of theological fatalism, Augustine would regard the appeal as
irrelevant.'• Because Augustine sees the threat to free will as arising from
(narrowly) causal necessity rather than (broadly) temporal necessity, the
Boethian move, which arguably succeeds against temporal necessity, cannot
defuse the threat. This makes any Augustinian anticipation of Boethius's
solution otiose, despite Augustine's adherence to a "Boethian" conception of
God on other (largely Neoplatonic) grounds. 's
Augustine's way out, then, comes to this. Divine foreknowledge does
indeed imply a kind of necessity; it even implies a kind of absolute necessity,
namely, "temporal necessity." W is temporally necessary inasmuch as the
future (given what God has already believed about it) is unavoidable. So
premise (1) is true, and it is true in just as strong a form as the fatalist claims.
But premise (2) is not true. Not every form of unavoidability is incompatible
with free will. This premise would be true only if W's necessity derived
from its being causally determined, or if W were in some other way explanatorily dependent on those factors that make it unavoidable. But divine foreknowledge makes the future unavoidable without causing or explaining it;
whether or not God exists in time, the causal! explanatory arrow runs in the
wrong direction for omniscience to undermine agency.lh
III

Is Augustine's real solution from ch. 4 any better than the supposed solution commentators have claimed to discover in ch. 3? In assessing the merits
of Augustine's position, it is helpful to compare it with its leading challenger,
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the solution first proposed by William Ockham. 111ere are many points of
agreement between the two. Consider the following assumptions which bear
on the fatalist's argument: (a) that divine omniscience encompasses the
future as well as the past and present; (b) that God may be said to know
future contingents before they take place; (c) that God knows something at a
time only if He believes it at that time; (d) that God's beliefs are not just
inerrant but infallible; (e) that what is genuinely past is temporally necessary
(i.e., no longer avoidable); and (f) that temporal necessity is dosed under
entailment (i.e., that if P is temporally necessary and P entails Q, then Q is
temporally necessary as well). On each of these points Augustine and
Ockham either accept the assumption (if only for the sake of argument) or
fail to challenge it (perhaps by overlooking it altogether).
The difference between Augustine and Ockham concerns two further
premises. Ockham's approach is to deny (g) that God's past beliefs about
future contingents are genuinely past. Ockham noted that, in the case of
"propositions [which] are about the present as regards both their wording
and their subject matter ... it is universally true that every true proposition
about the present has [corresponding to it] a necessary one about the
past."17 In the year 428 AD., for example, the true proposition
0) Augustine writes De haeresibus ad Quodvultdeum in 428 AD.
is about the present in subject matter as well as wording; consequently the
corresponding proposition about the past,
(2) Augustine wrote De haeresibus ad Quodvultdeum in 428 AD.,
is necessary at all later times, in the sense that its truth is then a fait accompli
which cannot be altered. Past-tense versions of propositions like (1), in
virtue of their temporal necessity, have come to be called "hard" facts about
the past. But Ockham denied that what is true for (1) and propositions like
it is true for all propositions: "that proposition that is about the present in
such a way that it is nevertheless equivalent to one about the future does
not have [corresponding to itl a necessary proposition about the past."
Taking 428 AD. once again as the present, consider
(3) Augustine writes De haeresibus ad Quodvultdeum in 428 AD., nine
hundred years before Ockham will flee Avignon.
This is equivalent to the future-tense proposition
(4) Ockham will flee Avignon nine hundred years after Augustine
writes De haeresibus ad Quodvultdeum in 428 AD.
Because (3) is not simply about the present but is equally about the future,
the past-tense proposition corresponding to it, namely,
(5) Augustine wrote De hacresibus ad Quodvultdellm in 428 AD., nine
hundred years before Ockham would flee A vignon,

14

Faith and Philosophy

need not set forth a fact that is necessary or unavoidable simply in virtue of
its being past. Relative to the year 1000 AD., for example, (5) is only a
"soft" fact about the past: its truth is not yet a fait accompli. It is only when
there is no longer an equivalent proposition about the future, i.e., after 1328,
that (5) becomes a "hard" fact about the past.
Given the notion of a soft fact about the past, Ockham further claimed
that "[am propositions having to do with predestination and reprobation
are of this sort ..., since they all are equivalently about the fuhue even
when they are verbally about the present or about the past."I" In the contemporary discussion this position has been extended to God's past beliefs
about future events. Just as (5) is a soft fact relative to 1000 AD., so
(6) God believed in 428 AD. that Ockham would flee Avignon in
1328 AD.
is also a soft fact relative to 1000 AD., since both refer to and depend upon
events subsequent to the year 1000. Only when Ockham actually flees does
it become a hard fact that God believed that he would do so. In general,
until X actually A's at t, God's prior belief that X will A at t is not available
as a hard fact about the past which can then mandate that the future unfold
in line with it. Thus divine foreknowledge provides no basis for inferring
that future events are temporally necessary, and acts of will like W emerge
with their freedom intact.
This is a sufficient characterization of Ockham's solution for present purposes. An important question is whether Ockham's denial of (g) is supposed
to be demonstrable, or whether it is simply proposed as a plausible "for-allwe-know" defense against the argument for theological fatalism. The former
is not, I think, very promising. For it even to get off the ground, there would
have to be some agreed-upon account of what it is for a fact to be so:ft rather
than hard. Attempts to provide such an account have yielded increasingly
baroque results whose complexities bear little evident relation to the simple
idea they are meant to caphue.19 Most accounts friendly to Ockhamism are
elaborations on an "entailment criterion" according to which the past-tense
statement, God believed in 428 that Ockham would flee in 1328, comes out as soft
(relative, say, to 1000 AD.) in virtue of the fact that it entails the future-tense
statement, Ockham will flee in 1328. But this is not a neutral account of soft
facthood, in that it takes the very entailment by which temporal necessity is
transferred from God's past belief to the future event and cites it as grounds
for denying that God's belief is temporally necessary in the first place. For
the anti-Ockhamist, the fact that God's antecedent beliefs metaphysically
entail subsequent events shows, not that the antecedent beliefs are soft facts
about the past, but that metaphysical entailment can link hard features of the
past with distinct facts about the future. 2u
If the basic problem with Ockhamistic proofs is that their accounts of the
hard/soft distinction beg the question, it is worth considering an argument
presented by Alvin Plantinga and recently revived by Ted A Warfield
which is formulable without any reference to this problematic distinction. 21
The argument assumes that logical fatalism rests on a fallacy, and then goes
on to show that theological fatalism is in the same boat. "Logical fatalism"

ON AUGUSTINE'S WAY OUT

15

is the position that fatalistic consequences can be derived directly from
future-tense truths, whether or not there is a God who infallibly believes
those truths. A logical fatalist would hold, for example, that the argument
Augustine considers in On Free Choice of the Will would be sound even if
premise (1) were replaced by
(1 #) W will occur ~ W is necessary.

Now Plantinga and Warfield are surely right about logical fatalism: there is
absolutely no reason to think that (1#), if true, involves anything stronger
than hypothetical necessity, and this poses no threat at all to free will. 22 The
Plantinga-Warfield argument then proceeds as follows. W is foreknown (by
God) both entails and is entailed by W will occur; given that God is necessarily existent and essentially omniscient, the two are logically equivalent. But
if W will occur is consistent with W's freedom (as it must be if logical fatalism is rejected), then W is foreknown (by God) must also be consistent with
W's freedom. (Warfield cites the principle, "If p and q are logically consistent, then p is consistent with any proposition that is logically equivalent to
q."23) So theological fatalism must suffer the same fate as logical fatalism,
and Ockhamism is triumphant?·
The main problem with this approach is that there is no obvious notion
of consistency under which the argument is as apodeictic as its supporters
take it to be. Warfield, for example, understands the consistency of p and q
as simply the logical possibility that the conjunction of p and q is true.25 But
even if this qualifies as a sense of "consistency", it is not the sense that is relevant to the argument. In rejecting the case for logical fatalism, we grant
that there is nothing in the mere fact that W will occur which entails that W
must occur; it is in this sense that the former is consistent with the negation
of the latter. But in granting this we are not thereby committing ourselves
to the proposition that there is a possible world in which W occurs without
having to occur, for there may be other facts which rule out this possibility.
So in asserting the consistency of p and q, we can't be asserting the logical
possibility of (p & q), as Warfield supposes. Furthermore, something which
is consistent with the fact of W's occurrence may be inconsistent with some
other fact even when the second fact is logically equivalent to the first. This can
be shown through the following story. A puckish paper appears in a philosophy journal purporting to demonstrate that, on the assumption that
3+4=7, it follows that existence is a good overall. The most brilliant minds
of the profession dissect the argument and discover the inevitable flaw. A
notorious atheologian named Waringa then takes advantage of the situation
to formulate his own argument, the gist of which is this: "The idea that
3+4=7 entails the overall goodness of existence has been demolished, as
everyone will agree. The fact that 3 added to 4 equals 7, just by itself, is
quite consistent with existence not being a good overall. But 3+4=7 is logically equivalent to God exists, since both propositions are true in all possible
worlds. Given that the overall badness of existence is consistent with the
fact that 3+4=7, it must also be consistent with the existence of God, since
these are logically equivalent. So God isn't the paragon of virtue theists
take Him to be." I trust that no one is swept away by this argument, and
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that the moral of the story is clear. For the consistency of divine foreknowledge with human freedom to follow from the consistency of future-tense
truth with human freedom, it is not enough that divine foreknowledge of
W entails and is entailed by W; the conclusion requires that there be nothing
more to God's foreknowledge of W than there is to W itself. But this can't be
right. Theism surely adds something to the data-set for fatalism, even if
what it adds (assuming theism to be true) goes hand-in-hand with the nontheistic data across all possible worlds. At the very least, if Wand God's
knowing W were just the same fact, this would be an astonishing property
of divine omniscience requiring considerable independent justificationhardly the sort of thing one could blithely presuppose in a proof of the
Ockhamist position. 26
In the absence of a convincing demonstration, we are left to judge
Ockhamism on grounds of general plausibility. Unfortunately,Ockham's
solution is highly counterintuitive. I have nothing new to add here to the
many critiques of Ockhamism that have already been offered in the literature, so let me simply sum up what I take the fundamental difficulty to be.
lt is very hard to see how the beliefs God holds at a time could be soft at a
later time just because the content of those beliefs concerns an even later
time. Consider the following propositions, treating them as factual:
(a) God believed in 1895 that Hunt would attend the Pacific Division
Meeting of the American Philosophical Association in 1995.
(~) Mahler's Second Symphony premiered in Berlin 100 years before
Huntwould attend the 1995 Pacific APA.
(y) Mahler's Second Symphony premiered in Berlin in 1895.
(8) Mahler hoped Richard Strauss would attend the premiere.
(£) Mahler believed his Second Symphony would ensure his fame.
(I;) Zeldon Prime [a time-traveller from 43rd-century Greenland]
attended the premiere of Mahler's Second in 1895.

The problem is that (a) seems more like (y) than like (~), in that something
already in place at, e.g., 1900 settles the question whether (a) and (y) are true
but does not settle the question whether (~) is true. (a) seems even more
like (8)-(1;): like (8) and (£), it reports a propositional attitude held by the
subject at an earlier time; and like (1;;), the state of affairs it sets forth depends
on a later state of affairs (my attending the Pacific APA in 1995, Zeldon
Prime's entering a time machine in the 43rd century). But (8)-(1;;) are no less
hard facts relative to 1900 than is (y): given that they are true, nothing can
happen in, e.g., 1900, to bring it about that Mahler did not so hope and
believe, or that Zeldon Prime did not so act, any more than one could bring
it about in 1900 that the premiere did not take place. And it's just not clear
how (a) is relevantly different from these hard facts about the past.
Of course the difference, according to Ockhamism, is that (a), like (~),
entails a future event. (Perhaps (I;) also qualifies by this criterion.) But it's
unclear why this difference should make a difference; it does nothing to
shake one's intuition that a complete cosmic record of everything that has
transpired up to 1000 A.D. will include the fact that God believed in 428 that
Ockham would flee in 1328 but will not include the fact that Ockham will flee in
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1328, though it can be inferred that the record will include the latter fact in
1328. It is very hard to see what a divine belief could be if it is to behave in

the ways required by Ockham's solution. 27
Much more could be (and has been) said about the counterintuitive baggage accompanying Ockham's rejection of (g), but this is enough for present
purposes, which call for nothing more than a comparison with Augustine.
In lieu of a proof that God's forebeliefs are soft (requiring that the baggage be
borne faute de mieux) or some way of reconceiving the problematic scenarios
or correcting the contrary intuitions (making the baggage disappear), these
difficulties must count against Ockhamism in any cost-benefit analysis. 28
Let us return, then, to Augustine's way out, which is to deny (h) that temporal necessity is incompatible with free will. This premise may seem hardly less negotiable than (g). If the actual past leaves no accessible futures in
which the agent refrains from performing W, how can the agent be regarded
as genuinely free and morally responsible in performing W? Harry
Frankfurt, discussing the related "principle of alternate possibilities," or
PAP: A person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he
could have done otherwise,
noted that it "has generally seemed so overwhelmingly plausible that some
philosophers have even characterized it as an a priori truth."29 As most readers are doubtless aware, however, Frankfurt went on to challenge this
"overwhelmingly plausible" principle. In denying (h), Augustine can be
said to anticipate Frankfurt and others who reject PAP as a requirement for
morally responsible agency.
An important advantage of looking to (h) rather than (g) for a response
to theological fatalism is that there are good reasons to question this
assumption, quite apart from any theistic motive to reconcile human freedom with divine foreknowledge. What Frankfurt et al. have tried to show is
that conditions rendering an action unavoidable negate the agent's moral
responsibility only if these same conditions also enter into the "actual
sequence" leading up to the action; otherwise they are irrelevant. For example, if I murder someone, and in so doing satisfy the most exacting conditions for free will, except that an irresistible power (a demon, crazed neurophysiologist, etc.) would have forced me to murder the person if I hadn't
done so on my own, this last factor does not appear to mitigate my responsibility in the least. Here no alternative to murder is available to me (so
PAP is unsatisfied), but I am nevertheless free and responsible in what I do,
since the factor excluding alternatives makes no causal contribution to my
actions, and indeed makes no difference at all to what actually happens.
The same can be said in cases involving divine foreknowledge. God's foreknowing the murder may make it unavoidable, but it does so without making any causal contribution to the murder, which would have occurred just
as it did in the absence of divine foreknowledge. We appear to have the
same reasons in this case for affirming my freedom and responsibility,
despite the unavoidability of my action, as we have in the first (nontheological) case. Indeed, divine foreknowledge provides superior counterexamples
to PAP, since it induces unavoidability without invoking the counterfactual
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intervener whose presence in the typical Frankfurt-style counterexample is
at the root of most objections to the anti-PAP argument. 30
It would be a serious liability for the Augustinian denial of (h) if this
move were unavailable to a libertarian. Fortunately this is not the case.
One can consistently maintain that W's freedom is compatible with temporal necessity while denying that it is compatible with causal necessity. John
Martin Fischer has dubbed this position "hyper-incompatibilism," presumably because the hyper-incompatibilist is so excessively committed to the
incompatibility of free agency and causal determinism that she is willing to
persist in this commitment regardless of PAP's fate. 3! (In this respect, at
least, it is the hyper-incompatibilist rather than the PAPist who might lay
claim to the title of "more-incompatibilist-than-thou"!)
Of course, the fact that the position is consistent doesn't mean that it is
also attractive or even plausible. If one regards PAP (combined with a
robust understanding of "could have done otherwise") as the main reason
for endorsing the incompatibility of causal determinism and moral agency,
there may seem little point to insisting on incompatibilism once PAP is
withdrawn. The principal critics of PAP, like Frankfurt and Fischer, are
compatibilists, while its main defenders, like William Rowe and Peter Van
Inwagen, are incompatibilists. 32 Nevertheless, "hyper-incompatibilism" is
not without worthy proponents, such as Eleonore Stump and Linda
Zagzebski?l There are reasons other than PAP that one could appeal to in
making causal indeterminism a requirement of free agency. Consider, for
example, Augustine's paradigm case of a causally undetermined will from
The City of God:
The bad will is the cause of the bad action, but nothing is the efficient
cause of the bad will .... For if two men, alike in physical and moral
constitution, see the same corporal beauty, and one of them is excited
by the sight to desire an illicit enjoyment while the other steadfastly
maintains a modest restraint of his will, what do we suppose brings it
about, that there is an evil will in the one and not in the other? ... The
same beauty was equally obvious to the eyes of both; the same secret
temptation pressed on both with equal violence. However minutely
we examine the case, therefore, we can discern nothing which caused
the will of the one to be evil. (XII.6)
One thing we can say about this agent, which we might not be able to say if
his will were causally determined, is that he is the autonomous initiator of
his actions, a little "first cause," so that in tracking moral responsibility we
can point to him and say with a fair degree of truth, lithe buck stops here."
If this is what is important to the libertarian about causal indeterminism,
she should not be concerned about any form of determinism which leaves
these features of agency intact. If Augustine's analysis of theological fatalism is correct, the unavoidability which characterizes actions in virtue of
their being foreknown by God is just such a form of determinism.
Whether divine beliefs can be soft features of the past, and whether anyone can be free in the libertarian sense despite an absence of alternative possibilities, are complex issues which the brief discussion in this section leaves
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far from resolved. Nothing said here shows Ockhamism to be false or
Augustinism to be true; I have simply engaged in an intuitive eyeballing of
the two accounts for purposes of handicapping the race. In so doing, it is
fair to say that I have given Augustine an easier time than Ockham. My
assessment of the latter is, I believe, reasonably objective, in the sense that
the defender of Ockham's solution would probably allow that it is counterintuitive in the ways I have suggested (while presumably insisting that the
overall case for Ockhamism is nevertheless strong and that intuitions sometimes mislead). But the brief glance at Augustine's rejection of (h) has
emphasized the positive without drawing attention to potential difficulties,
like the proper analysis of the because-relation and the best way to formulate
libertarian freedom in terms of causal! explanatory openness rather than
temporal openness. Certainly much about Augustine's position requires
further development and defense; but this would be out of place in the present paper, whose aim is simply to make Augustine a "player" in a game
currently dominated by Ockham. While my own judgment is that
Augustine's approach shows high promise while Ockham's is a virtual nonstarter, it is enough for the purposes of this essay if the reader is persuaded
by the considerations set forth in this section that Augustine's way out is at
least no less plausible than Ockham's.
IV

This minimalist conclusion could amount to damning with faint praise,
depending on how one assesses the Ockhamist position. Some readers may
be tempted to pronounce a pox on both houses, demoting Ockham's solution rather than promoting Augustine's. To avoid this outcome, I want now
to persuade the reader of a further conclusion: that Augustine and Ockham
represent the main options for anyone seeking a solution to the problem of
theological fatalism.
In response to an argument purporting to show that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with libertarian agency, there are only two strategies
available: accept the argument and deny one of the allegedly incompatible
terms, or assert their compatibility and reject the argument. The main rivals
to Ockham and Augustine follow the first strategy, most by denying divine
foreknowledge of future contingents. Some of these (e.g., Richard
Swinburne, William Hasker, and Peter Geach) place future contingents offlimits to God's knowledge, either by excluding them from the stock of
truths or by frankly denying divine omniscience; others (e.g., Boethius and
Aquinas) include them in divine knowledge but deny that God knows
them as future. Call this a theological response to the problem, since it
alleges an error in the fatalist's assumptions about God. Fewer theists deny
libertarian agency, at least on grounds of divine omniscience (as opposed
to, e.g., considerations of divine sovereignty). Jonathan Edwards, for example, denies it on both grounds. Call this an anthropological response to the
problem, inasmuch as it addresses the human side of the alleged incompatibility. In contrast to those who accept the argument but deny its application
to reality on theological or anthropological grounds, Ockham and
Augustine pursue the second strategy, rejecting the argument and affirming
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the compatibility of freedom and foreknowledge.
They are right to do so. If the argument is indeed sound, an action which
is in every other respect an ideal candidate for free agency can be deprived
of this status merely by adding infallible foreknowledge to the mbe But this
is preposterous on its face. How could a third-party's knowledge of my
future action, just by itself (and without special assumptions about the conditions under which such knowledge is possible), have any effect at all on
the action, let alone transform it to such an extent that it no longer qualifies
as free? List everything that could possibly be relevant to whether an action
A is an instance of free agency: that A is done willingly; that the will to do A
doesn't flout any of the agent's second-order desires; that the agent can
abstain from A should he choose to do so; that the agent is not acting under
coercion or duress; that A is not causally determined by events prior to the
agent's birth; that the agent is not acting in ignorance of relevant circumstances; and so on. Now assume that God has infallible foreknowledge of
A. This assumption should leave A completely unchanged with respect to
every item on the list. As Augustine rightly observes in On Free Choice of the
Will, "his foreknowledge does not take away my power; in fact, it is all the
more certain that I will have that power, since he whose foreknowledge
never errs foreknows that I will have it" (IIL3). The "aporetic" character of
the problem in this text reflects not only Augustine'S theological commitments-his policy of believing first and understanding later (I.2)-but the
inherent implausibility of what the argument for theological fatalism is trying to demonstrate.
The appropriate response to such an argument is aptly stated by William
Lane Craig: "Fatalism posits a constraint on human freedom which is
entirely unintelligible. Therefore, it must be false. Somewhere there is a fallacy in the argument, and we need only examine it carefully to find the
error."34 Fatalism presents us with a conceptual puzzle, not a serious proposal for how the world is arranged; its seductiveness reflects our uncertain
grip on the underlying concepts rather than testifying to the truth about
reality. The value of the fatalist's argument, like that of most philosophical
puzzles, is that it invites us to reexamine basic assumptions and put our
conceptual house in order. What mistakes in our thinking on such topics as
knowledge, time, agency, modality, and so on, need to be rectified if we are
not to be taken in by the argument? Theological and anthropological revisionism avoid this question rather than engaging it. There may, of course,
be good independent reasons for rejecting divine foreknowledge or libertarian freedom; Augustine himself, to one degree or another, was a revisionist
on both scores. But the argument for theological fatalism is too dubious to
serve as a reason in its own right, while those who embrace revisionism on
other grounds can (and should) still treat the fatalist's argument as a
thought-experiment whose philosophical interest lies in the aporia it raises.
In either case, complaining that God is not in fact omniprescient or that
humans are not in fact libertarianly free is as little to the point as dismissing
Zeno's "Achilles" paradox with the observation that Achilles was perhaps
not as fast as legend makes him out to be. Should anyone so misconstrue
this problem as to imagine that a challenge to Achilles' credentials would
undermine the force of the paradox, it may be necessary simply to stipulate
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Achilles' celerity and leave the "facts" (such as they are) to one side. The
same is true for theological fatalism, if one agrees with Craig (and me) that
the supposed incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom
lacks all prima facie credibility. In response to the revisionist who imagines
that denying one of these puzzle conditions does anything to undermine
the force of the problem, one should simply stipulate God's infallible
omniprescience and man's libertarian freedom and leave the truth on these
matters (whatever it might be) to one side.35
If we approach the problem aporetically, there are basically two tacks that
can be taken, corresponding to the two premises in Augustine's formulation
of the argument. The list of two paragraphs back rather obviously omits the
very condition for free agency to which the fatalist's argument is supposed
to make a difference: that the action be avoidable, i.e., that the agent have
access to alternative futures (given the actual past). Unlike the other conditions on the list, which concern (in whole or in part) what is or is not the case
in the actual world, this one prescribes how things must be in other possible
worlds. Omitting it from the list was not entirely disingenuous, if one suspects that any modal requirement for free agency must supervene on properties that the action and agent possess in the actual world; for then the difference infallible foreknowledge is supposed to make to free agency should
register as a difference in one or more of these other properties. But ignore
this possibility. Avoidability is the only feature of free agency which fatalism directly contests. So there are just two aporetic responses to the fatalist's
argument: show how infallible foreknowledge is in fact compatible with
avoidability; or explain why even a libertarian can deny that avoidability is a
condition of free agency. Ockham and his modem followers have provided
by far the most thorough and interesting case for the former, while
Augustine and the anti-PAPists have made the most powerful case for the
latter. These are the main options for anyone who eschews the easy out provided by theological and anthropological revisionism?"
Of the two, Augustine'S has been widely dismissed out of hand, leaving
Ockham's as the only viable option. I hope that my explication and defense
of Augustine's position in On Free Choice of the Will have gone some way
toward correcting the bad press that he has received over the years.
Augustine'S is not a solution that will satisfy only a compatibilist, as those
who fail to read past ch. 3 might suppose; nor is its "reverse memory"
model of divine foreknowledge more problematic in any obvious way than
Ockham's counterintuitive claims regarding the soft facthood of God's past
forebeliefs; nor does his "Frankfurtian" line on free will disqualify his solution from serious consideration. Given the quantities of ink that have been
spilled on Ockham's way out, there is little doubt that Augustine's is
deserving of more attention than it has received. 37
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the existence of creatures, not the particular facts about what they freely do. (It
should be noted that Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, in a recent
paper on Aquinas-"God's Knowledge and Its Causal Efficacy," in Thomas D.
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22. One way to explain this, though it's not essential to the argument, is in
terms of the hard / soft distinction. While it's true that, for any time t prior to the
occurrence of W, it was the case (relative to t) that W will occur, this fact about
the past is a paradigmatically soft fact about the past, on anyone's account of
soft facthood. So logical fatalism cannot secure for premise (1) a temporally
necessary antecedent, and therefore lacks anything inimical to free agency
which it can then transfer to (1)'s consequent.
23. "Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom are Compatible," p. 81.
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28. The following are especially good at bringing out what is mind-boggling
about Ockhamism while also treating the position with great care: John Martin
Fischer, "Freedom and Foreknowledge," Philosophical Review 92 (January 1983),
pp. 67-79; William Hasker, "Foreknowledge and Necessity," Faith and Philosophy
2 (April 1985), pp. 121-57; David Widerker, "Troubles with Ockhamism,"
Journal of Philosophy (1990), pp. 462-80; Linda Zagzebski, The Dilemma of Freedom
and Foreknowledge, op. cit., ch. 3, §3; and Nelson Pike, "A Latter-Day Look at the
Foreknowledge Problem," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 33 (June
1993), pp. 129-64.
29. Harry Frankfurt, "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,"
Journal of Philosophy 46 (1969), p. 829.
30. Or so I argue in my "Frankfurt Counterexamples: Some Comments on
the Widerker-Fischer Debate," Faith and Philosophy 13 (July 1996), pp. 395-401.
31. Fischer introduces the term on p. 180 of The Metaphysics of Free Will
(Oxford, UK, & Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1994).
32. Frankfurt discusses implications for compatibilism at the end of

26

Faith and Philosophy

"Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility," and Fischer in ch. 7 of The
Metaphysics of Free Will, opp. cit. For Rowe and Van Inwagen, see (respectively)
their ''Two Concepts of Freedom," Proceedings and Addresses of the American
Philosophical Association 61 (1987), pp. 43-64, and "Ability and Responsibility,"
Philosophical Review 87 (April 1978), pp. 201-24.
33. For Stump, see "Intellect, Will, and the Principle of Alternate
Possibilities," Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy, ed. Michael Beaty
(Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1990), pp. 254-85; and for
Zagzebski, see The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge, ch. 6, §2.1. I weigh in
on the hyper-incompatibilist side in my "Moral Responsibility and Unavoidable
Action," Philosophical Studies (forthcoming).
34. The Only Wise God (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1987), p. 69.
35. In "What Is the Problem of Theological Fatalism?" International
Philosophical Quarterly 38 (March 1998), pp. 17-30, I develop in considerably
more detail the idea that the problem of theological fatalism should be regarded
less as a theological challenge than as a metaphysical puzzle which is best
approached aporetically.
36. Of course there are other options as well. Scotism and Molinism, for
example, both deny the transfer of necessity from God's past forebeliefs to the
future objects of those beliefs, as required by premise (1) of the fatalist's argument. But neither of these alternatives comes close to challenging Ockhamism's
front-runner status. For the Scotist approach, see Anthony Kenny, The God of the
Philosophers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), pp. 55-58; for a critique of this
approach, see John Martin Fischer, "Scotism," Mind 94 (April 1985), pp. 231-43.
For Molinism, see Alfred J. Freddoso, "Introduction," Luis de Molina's On
Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the Concordia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1988), pp. 53-62. Linda Zagzebski devotes an entire chapter of The
Dilemma of Freedom {lnd Foreknowledge to the Molinist "solution," but admits that
"It is not perfectly clear to me from Freddoso's account just how middle knowledge is connected with the denial of the TNPs [Transfer of Necessity
Principles]" (p. 132).
37. For useful responses to the paper, I would like to thank Bob Kane, Bill
Wainwright, Linda Zagzebski, and an anonymous referee for this journal.

